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Coinbase Wants Bitcoin to Prepare for Quantum Computers Now. What Should African Developers Do?

ME
BY MEGASLEY
Verified Contributor
| 3M AGO | 3 MIN READ |
SECURITY DEVELOPMENT INFRASTUCTURE

Coinbase holds approximately 5% of all Bitcoin in existence today. On October 14, 2026, the exchange published a blog post with a direct message to the Bitcoin developer community: start preparing for quantum computers now, not later.

The proposal is detailed, technically grounded, and deliberately timed. Furthermore, it carries weight precisely because of who is saying it. A custodian holding that much Bitcoin has a direct financial interest in making sure quantum computers cannot drain its clients’ wallets. Coinbase is not raising a theoretical concern. It is raising an operational one.

For African Bitcoin developers in particular, the proposal matters in ways that go beyond the technical. African developers are increasingly contributing to the Bitcoin protocol layer, through programs like Btrust, Africa Free Routing, and the broader open-source community. This is exactly the kind of foundational work that affects them directly.

What is the quantum threat to Bitcoin?

Bitcoin’s security rests on two cryptographic signature schemes: ECDSA and Schnorr. Both are extremely secure against classical computers. The math behind them is so hard that no computer today can reverse-engineer a private key from a public key or digital signature.

A sufficiently powerful quantum computer changes that equation. Specifically, a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) could, in theory, reverse that math and derive a private key from a public key. If that happens, any wallet whose public key is visible on the blockchain becomes vulnerable. The attacker could reconstruct the private key and drain the wallet.

Google researchers have suggested a machine capable of this could exist as early as 2029. That is not a guaranteed timeline. However, it is close enough that preparation needs to start now, given how long Bitcoin protocol changes take.

Why Coinbase says the fix must start immediately

Bitcoin’s decentralised design is its greatest strength. However, it is also what makes upgrades slow. Coinbase put it plainly in its post: “Bitcoin consensus changes, and ecosystem migrations can take years.” Therefore, waiting until a CRQC is announced before starting the work is not a viable strategy. By the time the threat is confirmed, the window to protect wallets may already be closing.

Furthermore, some Bitcoin addresses are already more vulnerable than others. Specifically, Pay-to-Public-Key (P2PK) addresses expose the public key directly on the blockchain. Reused P2PKH addresses are also exposed after the first transaction, because sending Bitcoin requires broadcasting the public key. Both categories are at higher risk if a CRQC ever becomes available.

Coinbase estimates that approximately 1 in 4 Bitcoin currently in circulation sits in exposed addresses. That is a significant portion of the network’s total supply at risk if the threat materialises without a fix in place.

What Coinbase is specifically proposing

The exchange is not asking Bitcoin to adopt a single quantum-resistant algorithm overnight. Instead, it is proposing a structured, staged transition with six specific recommendations.

First, separate the container from the signature. Bitcoin’s transaction format should be flexible enough to support new post-quantum signature types without rebuilding the whole system. Two proposals currently on the table fit this description: P2MR (BIP-360) and P2TRv2. Both allow different signature types to coexist, making future upgrades easier.

Second, staged protection. Coinbase supports a transition where active wallets can start using quantum-resistant signatures before Bitcoin finalises rules for older signature types. One proposed approach is a “1-of-2” setup where the same Bitcoin can be spent using either a traditional ECDSA or Schnorr key or a post-quantum key. This protects users earlier without forcing an immediate mass migration.

Third, support for both stateful and stateless schemes. Some post-quantum signature schemes require wallets to track which signing keys have already been used. If a wallet restores from an old backup without that record, it could accidentally reuse a key, creating a forgery vulnerability. Coinbase recommends supporting stateless options alongside stateful ones to give developers and users a safer path.

Fourth, robust implementations. Any quantum-resistant scheme adopted by Bitcoin should work reliably across platforms, verify signatures consistently, avoid leaking secret information through timing, and remain secure even if a random-number generator fails during signing.

Fifth, MPC compatibility. For exchanges, custodians, and large institutions, post-quantum schemes must work with multi-party computation (MPC). MPC splits private key operations across multiple parties so no single point of failure can drain a large wallet. This is directly relevant to how Coinbase itself manages custody for its institutional clients.

Sixth, a separate debate about dormant wallets. Not everyone will migrate to post-quantum addresses in time. Some wallets have been dormant for years. Some belong to people who have lost their keys. Coinbase does not take a position on what should happen to these coins but argues that debate should happen separately so it does not delay the main protection work for everyone else.

Why this matters for African Bitcoin developers

The quantum readiness conversation is happening at the Bitcoin protocol layer. That is precisely where African developers, increasingly funded by Btrust and trained through programs like Africa Free Routing’s bootcamps, are beginning to contribute.

Specifically, this conversation touches several areas where African developers are actively building skills:

Bitcoin Core contributions. Developers like Abubakar Sadiq, a Btrust-funded contributor, work directly on Bitcoin Core. Post-quantum signature proposals will eventually require review, testing, and implementation work inside Bitcoin Core. That is exactly the kind of contribution pathway the Btrust fellowship and Africa Free Routing’s open-source curriculum are preparing developers for.

Lightning Network implications. The Lightning Network builds on Bitcoin’s base layer security. If base layer signature schemes change, Lightning implementations need to adapt too. African Lightning developers trained through AFR’s bootcamps will need to understand how post-quantum changes propagate up the stack.

Wallet development. Many African Bitcoin startups are building wallets, payment tools, and merchant infrastructure. Post-quantum readiness will eventually affect every wallet. Developers building these tools today should be aware of the transition coming and design their systems to accommodate it.

Self-custody education. Africa’s Bitcoin circular economies are built on self-custody and Lightning payments. The grassroots educators and community organisers teaching self-custody in Kibera, Cotonou, and Lagos need to eventually explain to ordinary users why they should migrate to post-quantum addresses. That education needs to be developed well before the threat becomes urgent.

How urgent is this, really?

It is worth being honest about the timeline. A CRQC capable of breaking Bitcoin’s cryptography does not exist today. Furthermore, many researchers think 2029 is an optimistic estimate for when one might arrive. Some put it further out. Others question whether the specific technical barriers can be overcome at all at the required scale.

However, Coinbase’s core argument does not depend on a precise timeline. It depends on how long Bitcoin upgrades take. If a consensus change takes three to five years from proposal to deployment, and a CRQC arrives with little warning, the window to protect vulnerable wallets could be very short. Starting the work now does not mean rushing a solution. It means giving the process the time it needs.

Furthermore, beginning the technical work has value independent of the quantum threat. Flexible address formats, better signature scheme modularity, and MPC-compatible cryptography make Bitcoin more resilient against a range of future threats, not just quantum computers.

What African developers should do now

The honest answer is that most African developers building on Lightning or working on merchant tooling do not need to change anything they are building today. The quantum threat is at the protocol layer, and any changes there will be backward-compatible by design.

However, there are three things worth doing now.

First, follow the BIP-360 and P2TRv2 discussions. These are the two proposals Coinbase specifically highlights. Following them on the Bitcoin developer mailing list and GitHub gives you early visibility into where the protocol is heading.

Second, contribute to the review process. Post-quantum proposals will need extensive review, testing, and documentation. African developers with Bitcoin Core familiarity can contribute to that work through the same channels they use for any other Bitcoin open-source contribution. Platforms like Pull (pullos.dev) can help identify specific open issues to contribute to.

Third, build migration-aware applications. If you are building wallets or payment tools today, design them with address migration in mind. That means avoiding patterns that lock users into non-upgradeable address types and using abstractions that can accommodate new signature schemes when they eventually arrive.

Bitcoin’s quantum readiness is not an African developer problem. It is a global Bitcoin problem. However, the African developers now entering the protocol contribution pipeline are the ones who will help solve it. That is not a burden. It is an opportunity.

Sources

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